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1. Completeness Physicalism 
Why is it reasonable to try to explain consciousness in physical terms, in terms of 
information integration, ion channels, or resonant frequencies? Or to search for the 
origins of life in the principles of thermodynamics? To look to the spin states of 
elementary particles for a means of early cancer detection? Or to think that what is 
accelerating all galaxies away from each other must be some kind of physical force? 
Although the answers to all of these questions vary in their details, there is a 
working assumption underlying them all. This is an assumption the scientist (the 
neuroscientist, biologist, medical researcher, or cosmologist) takes for granted and rarely 
if ever will explicitly discuss. The assumption is that our world is fundamentally physical, 
that physics is a fundamental science and so there are physical truths that can serve to 
explain even the most complex (and animate) scientific phenomena. As the philosopher 
would put it, the working assumption behind this and so much else of scientific research 
is that some sort of physicalism is true. 
My aim in this paper is to put this basic assumption under philosophical scrutiny 
and ask what is the right way to understand physicalism. There is a standard way of 
interpreting it, certainly in the philosophical literature, but also I think more broadly in 
the scientific community. This is as a completeness thesis of some kind. Let’s 
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characterize the view I will call completeness physicalism disjunctively in the following 
way: 
Completeness physicalism: all facts or entities consist of or are dependent on or 
supervene on or are realized by or may be completely explained by or grounded in 
the facts or entities of physics. 
Completeness physicalists believe that there is or in principle could be some future 
physics that plays this role of providing a complete explanatory or ontological basis for 
our universe.1 And this provides a basis for claiming that physics is special among the 
sciences, that it is fundamental. There is in principle some physical theory that alone 
provides supervenience bases or realizers or grounds for all facts or entities, or that 
describes a class of independent entities on which all else depends, or that is 
explanatorily privileged in some way, in being explanatorily complete. My main aim in 
this paper will be to show why we as physicalists should move beyond completeness 
interpretations of physicalism and the completeness of physics.  
Typically those who have raised critiques of positions like completeness 
physicalism do so in order to motivate some version of dualism, pointing to phenomena 
like phenomenal consciousness that seem to resist explanation in physical terms. Yet it is 
easy to show that completeness physicalism is unjustified, if not outright false, without 
making any appeal to consciousness or other intractable mental phenomena. 
Completeness physicalism is problematic already for its reliance on questionable 
assumptions about physics, many of which have been widely recognized as questionable 
in the philosophy of science for decades. Moreover, completeness physicalism is 
 
1 Or perhaps, our concrete universe. 
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untenable in failing to provide the physicalist with any usable guide to ontology or 
metaphysical commitments. This undermines the entire point of adopting a position like 
physicalism: to give one an empirically motivated metaphysical framework that can then 
be put to work in directing one’s philosophical and scientific projects.  
Before I develop these points, I want to make it clear that my aim in criticizing 
completeness physicalism, unlike that of others who have raised some of these concerns 
(Crane and Mellor 1990, Koons and Bealer 2010, Stoljar 2010), is not to try to convince 
us to discard physicalism. I am a physicalist, and I think physicalism is an important 
position worth defending because it is a position that has done a lot of good for us, 
motivating philosophical programs, bodies of scientific research, and technological 
innovations that have improved our lives.2 Thus, it is important for us as physicalists to 
be clear about the flaws with the standard, completeness interpretations of physicalism so 
that we may move past them and formulate versions of physicalism that can withstand 
critical scrutiny. 
 To that end, I will propose a formulation of physicalism that could be used to 
replace the standard completeness interpretations. I will contrast the standard 
completeness physicalism with what I regard as a more plausible maximality physicalism. 
While completeness physicalism asserts the ontological or explanatory completeness of 
some future or in principle formulable physical theory, maximality physicalism instead 
only requires the ontological or explanatory maximality of our current physical theories. 
That is, it requires the ontological or explanatory superiority of physics, in certain 
 
2 I will not therefore be advocating we reject physicalism and replace it with some kind of 
dualism. I am optimistic, based on progress in the philosophical and scientific study of 
consciousness, that we will be able to explain conscious experience in physical terms. 
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respects, over all other scientific theories or epistemic frameworks. I think the maximality 
physicalism I develop below is a promising way to go, but my primary goal in this paper 
will not be to convince the reader to adopt my specific form of maximality physicalism. 
The main point here is rather that completeness physicalism ought to be replaced, and 
something like my maximality physicalism takes us in a more promising direction, more 
in line with what we know about physics and what we want from physicalism, than 
completeness physicalism does.  
 I will rely on one fixed point in the discussion that follows since it is important to 
have some fixed point when we are asking questions about how to interpret some key 
concept or position. This is a claim I have already made and now want to underline about 
the practical import of physicalism: physicalism is worth defending for its success and 
future promise in motivating explanatory, predictive, and engineering projects in 
philosophy, science, technology, and public life that have in the past and continue to 
improve our lives in many ways. The adoption of physicalism drives ways of 
understanding ourselves and many previously puzzling aspects of reality, motivating an 
impressively broad range of explanations. It motivates frameworks for modeling and 
predicting the behavior of complex systems, including biological systems, with an 
extraordinary level of precision, leading to innovations with medical and other practical 
benefits too numerous to mention.3 This is the physicalism we are trying to characterize.  
 
2. Hempel’s Dilemma 
 
3 See Dove and Elporidorou (2019), and also Melnyk (2009) on naturalism, both of 
whom also emphasize the positions’ roles as research programs. 
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We can begin to see the problems with completeness physicalism by considering a 
question about the formulation of physicalism raised by Hempel (1980). This is 
commonly called Hempel’s dilemma. Hempel asked, if we are to be physicalists and 
claim that physics occupies a privileged position among the sciences – in the positivistic 
terms of his day, that it be regarded as the unitary language of science – then which 
“physics” are we talking about? 
The physicalistic claim that the language of physics can serve as a unitary 
language of science is inherently obscure: The language of what physics is meant? 
Surely not that of, say, 18th century physics; for it contains terms like ‘caloric 
fluid’, whose use is governed by theoretical assumptions now thought false. Nor 
can the language of contemporary physics claim the role of unitary language, 
since it will no doubt undergo further changes, too. The thesis of physicalism 
would seem to require a language in which a true theory of all physical 
phenomena can be formulated. But it is quite unclear what is to be understood 
here by a physical phenomenon. (1980: 195) 
Hempel’s dilemma is the problem that if physicalism is understood in terms of current 
physics, then it is false, because current physics will likely be replaced with a better 
theory, and physics presently doesn’t have the resources to characterize all phenomena. 
But if physicalism is understood in terms of future physics, then it is difficult to know 
what physicalism comes to, because we don’t yet know what the future completed theory 
is.4 
 
4 For discussions of Hempel’s Dilemma, see Papineau and Spurrett (1999), Ney (2008c), 
Stoljar (2010), and the essays in Dowell (2006a).  
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Most physicalists who address this issue today do not regard it as much of a 
problem because they think the answer is obvious. Surely physicalism is a claim about 
the ontological or explanatory completeness of some future physics. Past physical 
theories were all in some way false, and current physics, if it isn’t false, is at least 
incomplete.5 So physicalists go about characterizing their position in terms of the 
completeness of some future physical theory. For example, according to Loewer, 
“physicalism claims that all facts obtain in virtue of the distribution of the fundamental 
entities and properties – whatever they turn out to be – of completed fundamental physics” 
(2001, see also Dowell 2006b, Pettit 1993). And Lewis defined physicalism (he preferred 
the term ‘materialism’) as the view that “physics – something not too different from 
present-day physics, though presumably somewhat improved – is a comprehensive theory 
of the world, complete as well as correct” (1983: 361). 
We can see Lewis here as being cautious here, hoping that this future completed 
physical theory is close enough on the scientific horizon that we already have some idea 
of its theoretical commitments. Lewis’s characterization of physicalism thus attempts to 
navigate between the two horns of the dilemma. But given the magnitude of the open 
problems in current physics, it is not likely physics will reach completion without 
significant revolutions. To cite just two examples, physics still has no idea what makes up 
dark matter, which is supposed to constitute 85% of the total mass in our universe (Duda 
and Garrett 2011). There was an early near-consensus that dark matter could be explained 
by the postulation of a supersymmetric particle, the neutralino, but as of yet, there has 
 
5 Only Melnyk (1997, 2003) seems to recommend viewing physicalism as the view that 
current physics provides a complete explanatory or ontological basis for reality. He takes 
current physics to provide a complete set of realizers for all entities. 
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been no evidence for supersymmetry at the LHC (Redlinger and de Jong 2017). So, the 
empirical evidence does not seem to point toward understanding dark matter as 
constituted by supersymmetric particles. In addition, although physicists would very 
much like to have a quantum theory of gravity, there is no consensus here either of what 
is even the right starting point from which to develop such a theory. String theories, 
strategies based on canonical quantum gravity, and approaches like causal set theory all 
have very different theoretical starting points and arrive at very different fundamental 
ontologies ranging from strings to spin foams to causal sets (Smolin 2001). Given the 
significance of these problems, a completed physics seems very much in the future, and 
its nature obscure.6  
 I want us to be clear now just how problematic this is for the kind of physicalist 
Hempel has in mind, one whose claim is that physics should serve as the unitary language 
of science. This is a physicalist like Carnap (1934, 1936) or Neurath (1931) whose core 
claim is that one should aim to translate all other sciences into the one language of 
physics, or the physical language, thus promoting the unity of science.7 Since a 
formulation in a single language makes more transparent the connections between 
different fields, and translation into the language of physics in particular allows a 
science’s claims to be intersubjectively testable, this sort of physicalism was not intended 
merely as a linguistic claim, but one that had the potential to be practically useful in 
improving science as we know it. 8 How is this physicalist supposed to go about her task 
 
6 See Smolin (2007) for an overview. 
7 Carnap and Neurath went back and forth over the years discussing whether it was the 
language of physics, or some other language that should serve as the unitary language of 
science. 
8 See Ney (2008a) for further discussion and references.  
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of translating the statements of all other sciences into the language of physics, if the 
relevant physics is one of the distant future? The problem is, Hempel’s physicalist is 
trying to do something with physics. And she can’t do something with a physics she can’t 
get her mind around. 
 If we are going to take seriously the idea of physics as a unitary language of 
science, then we have to be talking about some version of physics we have access to. This 
will be current physics. But this then takes us back to the first horn of the dilemma. 
Current physics is likely to be replaced. It isn’t the final theory. It isn’t a complete theory. 
But now it becomes natural to ask: for the role Hempel’s physicalist wants physics to 
play, does it need to be a final theory? Does it need to be a complete theory? To these 
questions, the answer is clearly “No.” Physics doesn’t need to be final or complete for it 
to be reasonable for us to begin the process of unifying science with it. For it to be “the 
best we have” in certain salient respects is enough to motivate us to use it in this respect.9 
And so the first horn of Hempel’s dilemma isn’t a problem after all, at least for the 
version of physicalism Hempel was concerned with. It is only a problem if we make the 
false assumption that for the language of physics to be the unitary language of science, 
physics must be complete or a final theory.  
 I hope this is clear enough for the version of physicalism that Hempel had in mind. 
What should we say about more contemporary versions of physicalism, versions that 
instead take physics to be a fundamental science in some respect, where this doesn’t 
mean that we should try to translate the statements of all other sciences into the language 
 
9 Carnap (1934) and Neurath (1931) certainly didn’t think a theory needed to be final or 
complete to play this role. Both often took seriously the idea that the unitary language of 
science should be the language we use to describe ordinary material objects. But the folk 
theory of ordinary material objects is surely not a final or complete theory. 
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of physics? My claim is that we reach a similar conclusion. If physicalism motivates us to 
do something with physics, then the second horn of the dilemma is still a problem: we 
can’t do anything with a theory we can’t get our mind around. Indeed, as we will see, 
there are more problems with taking the “physics” in physicalism to be some future, 
completed physical theory than this. And yet, the first horn does not present a problem. 
For what the contemporary physicalist needs physics to do, it does not need to be a final 
or complete theory. 
 
3. Maximality Physicalism 
It is now time to put a proposal on the table for what a more promising and useful 
formulation of physicalism could look like, a position I call maximality physicalism. 
Maximality physicalism gets us what we want from physicalism without facing the 
problems completeness physicalism faces. However, I recognize the proposal I will make 
is only a start. It is just one way to go in developing a version of physicalism that is well-
supported and can play the roles the physicalist needs it to play. 
 According to maximality physicalism, physics holds a privileged status among the 
sciences not in being ontologically or explanatorily complete, but in being ontologically 
or explanatorily maximal, or superior in some respect. The version I recommend takes 
physics to be maximal in the sense that it provides a successful class of explanations that 
are broader, deeper, and more precise than those of any other science or explanatory 
scheme.10  Its explanations are broader in the sense of covering more phenomena. Its 
 
10 There may be a way of developing an ontological sense of maximality for physics, a 
way that improves upon supervenience, realization, or grounding formulations of 
completeness physicalism. However, I will focus only on an explanatory construal here. 
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explanations are deeper in tracing the constitutive bases of phenomena further than other 
explanatory schemes. Its explanations are more precise in having more mathematical 
specificity (e.g. are given to more decimal places) than those of other explanatory 
schemes.  
 Note that to say that physics is fundamental in this sense, that it is explanatorily 
maximal, is not to say that its explanations are all things considered better than the 
explanations provided by other sciences or explanatory schemes, nor of course that the 
other sciences should or could be eliminated. It is a complicated and vexed issue what 
makes for the best explanation of a given phenomenon, indeed it is a complicated and 
vexed issue what makes for an explanation of a given phenomenon. In claiming that the 
explanations of physics are maximal, my claim is only that as a whole they are broader, 
deeper, and more precise than that of other sciences. To claim that physics is fundamental 
is not therefore to claim that physics is better than other sciences. 
 When one holds the claim that physics is privileged or fundamental in the sense of 
being explanatorily maximal, this will then justify a set of attitudes that make up what I 
have elsewhere called the physicalist attitude (Ney 2008b; see also van Fraassen 2002 for 
a predecessor position and Stoljar 2015 for critique). For the completeness physicalist, 
the physicalist attitude is just the belief that the world is the way (the completed) physics 
says it is, or that everything supervenes on the physical facts, or is grounded in the 
physical facts, or… But given the maximality physicalist’s assessment that the world 
isn’t simply the way physics says it is (nor does it supervene on or is wholly grounded in 
the physical facts or…), she won’t have this sort of belief. For her, the physicalist attitude 
 11 
will amount to something different. As a first pass, we may characterize the physicalist 
attitude in the following way: 
• the disposition to take on commitment to the kinds of things our best current physical 
theories say exist, that is to use them in one’s philosophical and scientific projects 
• the disposition to not take on commitment to the kinds of things that one thinks won’t 
be explained by current physical theories11 
• the expectation (given that current physics is not yet complete) that near future 
physical theories will continue to improve in their ability to guide explanatory, 
predictive, and technological projects 
These are all attitudes we expect of a physicalist reasonably informed about the character 
of current physics.12 Although the completeness physicalist attempts something more, 
this something more is not reasonable in light of the arguments I will provide in the next 
three sections. 
Hempel’s Dilemma is avoided when one claims only the maximality, not the 
completeness of physics. To the question of what should be the unitary language of 
science or what should be considered the fundamental science, the answer for the 
physicalist is of course the language of current physics, the only physics that is presently 
formulated and reasonable to use in one’s projects. As Melnyk notes: 
 
11 This disposition is made plausible by the vast scope of physical explanations, their 
depth in providing constitutive explanations of a diverse range of phenomena, and a kind 
of exclusion reasoning, that it would be unreasonable to believe in phenomena that aren’t 
explained physically (cf. Kim 2005). For more, see Section 7. Further development of 
this connection between the maximality thesis and the physicalist attitude is work in 
progress. Again, my main aim here is to show why completeness physicalism should be 
rejected and to give an initial sketch of what a reasonable replacement position would 
look like. 
12 See Maddy (2007) for an approach to naturalism in a similar spirit. 
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Physicalists who hold, as I do, that current scientific findings provide support for 
physicalism must at the least have a formulation of physicalism whose content is 
determinable by us now. But it is hard to see how else they can get one other than 
by defining “physical” by appeal to current physics; so that is what I shall do. 
(Melnyk 2003, p. 14) 
Which part or version or interpretation of current physics provides a metaphysical 
framework for one’s projects is a matter left up to the individual physicalist. Scientific 
practice underdetermines the content of current physics in several ways (French 2014, 
Chapter 2). So there are many satisfactory ways to be a physicalist. 
 
4. The Vacuity Objection 
Now that we have these two contrasting versions of physicalism to consider, we can 
begin to see the significant problems facing completeness physicalism and how moving 
in the direction of something more like maximality physicalism can help to better capture 
the view the physicalist is trying to put forward. 
 I am going to start by returning to the challenge for completeness physicalism 
raised on the second horn of Hempel’s Dilemma because it has not been recognized by 
most physicalists just how serious this challenge to their position is. Indeed it has been 
used by philosophers such as Crane and Mellor (1990), Van Fraassen (2002), and Stoljar 
(2010) to argue that we should not be physicalists. Crane and Mellor use it in part to 
argue that “physicalism is the wrong answer to a meaningless question,” Stoljar to advise 
us that the places in philosophy where we have used physicalism to try to state a thesis or 
motivate a project would be better off if we avoided talk of physicalism altogether. As 
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I’ve already said, I am convinced that adopting physicalism and using it to motivate work 
not just in philosophy, but in science, engineering, and public life, is very much a good 
thing. The physicalist attitude has yielded for those who adopt it many epistemic and 
practical benefits. So we should not be so quick to give it up. Nonetheless the 
philosophers I just mentioned are all correct that the current dominant form of 
physicalism faces a significant challenge. 
 The challenge again is that we don’t know what a future completed physics looks 
like and so this makes physicalism framed as the view that a future, completed physics 
provides a complete explanatory or ontological basis vacuous, or at least lacking in 
sufficient content. To this, one might reply that of course the phrase ‘a future, completed 
physics’ has content. We know what physics is, what ‘future’ and ‘completed’ means. 
What this shows is that the vacuity objection requires a bit more spelling out so that we 
may see the problem. 
 In my view, there are two significant issues raised by the vacuity objection. First, 
our ignorance of what a future, completed physics will look like undermines the ability of 
completeness physicalism to play the role in guiding philosophical, scientific, and 
engineering projects that physicalism is supposed to play. Second, this ignorance 
undermines the justification for completeness physicalism. 
 Again, physicalism is good and worth defending because of the role it plays in 
motivating projects that have enhanced our understanding of ourselves and other organic 
and inorganic systems, as well as our place in the universe, in promoting advancements in 
scientific research, and in providing a framework that guides us towards certain 
engineering strategies that have improved our lives in numerous ways. For this to work, 
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research and development must begin with certain facts about what our physical theories 
posit, the kinds of principles they employ, as well as those they do not. Thus, Hempel’s 
concerns are just as relevant for the contemporary understanding and use of physicalism, 
not just the form of physicalism explored by the logical positivists. Just as much today as 
in the past, physicalism guides us to make use of physics because it has some special 
features other theories do not. But we can only make use of a physics whose formulation 
we have at hand. 
 Second, physicalism is a position that is empirically justified. It is a myth that 
some anti-physicalists use in their polemics that physicalism is nothing more than a 
dogma arising due to some kind of unreasonable physics fetish. As Papineau showed in 
his 2001 paper “The Rise of Physicalism,” physicalism is not a dogma. It is a position 
supported by empirical argument, one citing the predictive, explanatory, and other 
scientific successes of our current physical theories, successes that have not similarly 
been achieved by other epistemic frameworks.13  These successes are of course the 
successes of physical theories that have actually been formulated and put to work. They 
are not successes of some future, completed physical theory. And so we can only build a 
case for the special explanatory or ontological status of our current physical theories, for 
the fundamentality of our current physical theories, not for any future ones, because they 
haven’t had any successes. To remain committed to some unformulated physical theory, 
one that hasn’t met any empirical successes, should strike one as deeply unmotivated. 
 
13 I have raised issues for the details of the argument that Papineau formulates in that 
paper (Ney 2016, 2019), relying as it does on a claim about the causal explanatory 
completeness of physics, but the big point Papineau is making in that paper about 
physicalism being supported by the empirical track record of physics in explaining a 
broad and diverse range of phenomena is correct. See Section 7 for more discussion. 
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This plays right into the hands of the anti-physicalists who accuse physicalists of clinging 
to dogma.  
 Here I should comment on some alternative strategies that have been used to 
address the vacuity objection, different than my own proposal, which is to characterize 
physicalism in terms of the maximality of current formulated physics, rather than the 
completeness of future as-of-yet unformulated physics. Some try to respond to the 
vacuity objection by filling in the conception of what a future, completed physics will 
look like, saying physical theories are theories of a certain kind: theories that postulate a 
certain class of entities or theories that engage in explanations of a certain kind. One 
might then try to use such a more substantive characterization of physical theory in order 
to formulate responses to my two vacuity-related concerns about completeness 
physicalism.  
 There are three kinds of characterization of physical theories that recur in the 
literature: (a) those that characterize physical theories as theories that provide 
microscopic bases for other phenomena (e.g. Pettit 1993, Dowell 2006), (b) those that 
characterize physical theories as theories that describe a class of entities spread out 
somehow in spacetime (e.g. Poland 1994, Dowell 2006, Howell 2013), and (c) those that 
characterize physical theories as those that make appeal only to entities that are 
(fundamentally) nonmental (e.g. Montero and Papineau 2005, Wilson 2006). Using one 
of these characterizations, one might respond to my first concern by saying it is true, one 
doesn’t know what the final completed physics will look like in its details, but since 
physical theories are theories that characterize phenomena ultimately in terms of 
[microscopic bases or entities in spacetime or nonmental phenomena], then completeness 
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physicalism recommends projects that start from a class of [microscopic constituents, or 
entities in spacetime, or nonmental entities] because we know now that is what a final, 
completed physics will postulate. To answer the second worry, one would point to the 
empirical support that has accrued to theories formulated in terms of [microscopic bases 
or entities in spacetime or fundamentally nonmental phenomena]. One can then claim 
that this provides empirical support for a completed theory that is a theory of 
[microscopic bases or spacetime entities, or fundamentally nonmental phenomena] and 
this in turn can provide empirical support for completeness physicalism.14  
 Although the response to the first worry is interesting and worth spending some 
time on, the response to the second clearly fails, for any such strategy of filling in the 
notion of the physical. For it just isn’t the case that all or even most theories formulated 
in terms of microscopic bases or spacetime entities or fundamentally nonmental 
phenomena have empirical support. Some do. Some do not. Just the fact that a theory is 
formulated in these terms doesn’t on its own serve to garner that theory any empirical 
support. And so there is no empirical support for the claim that any as of yet 
unformulated future theory describing [microscopic bases or entities in spacetime or 
fundamentally nonmental phenomena] will be empirically supported. So any such 
characterization of the physical will not suffice to answer the vacuity objection. 
Nonetheless let’s address the response to the first worry. 
  This was that we can see completeness physicalism as recommending particular 
kinds of philosophical and scientific projects in the following way. Since we know that a 
final, completed physics will describe the world in terms of [microscopic constituents or 
 
14 This is indeed what is done in Papineau and Spurrett (1999), appealing to a notion of 
the physical as (c) the fundamentally nonmental. 
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entities in spacetime or fundamentally nonmental entities], we can see that completeness 
physicalism recommends projects that address the world in these terms. The problem is 
we can’t know that the final, completed physics will describe the world in these terms. 
Indeed there are physical theories today, widely accepted physical theories, that fail to 
meet these philosophers’ criteria of what physical theories look like. In physics, wholes 
are not always explained in terms of the features of microscopic parts. Appeals to 
emergence are rampant. Physics challenges the notion that spacetime is fundamental and 
routinely appeals to more basic frameworks that can explain the appearance of spacetime 
in certain regimes (Hugget and Wüthrich 2013). And irreducible mental phenomena are 
appealed to throughout physics, not merely in claims of consciousness collapsing the 
wave function, but more widely in use of unexplained notions of information and 
anthropic principles. There are certainly physicalists who frown upon or lament these 
facts, especially the last. But they are facts about what real, mainstream physics looks 
like. And so the claim that the proposed criteria correctly characterize what it is to be a 
physical theory simply fail, because they fail to characterize actual physical theories in 
use by actual physicists.15 This is an illustration of the point put well by Van Fraassen 
that: 
Whenever philosophers take some general feature of physics and use it to identify 
what is material, what happens? Physics soon goes on to describe things that lack 
that feature and are altogether different. (2002) 
 
15 This isn’t to say that there aren’t positions in the neighborhood of physicalism that one 
might want to defend. In the spirit of seventeenth century corpuscularianism, one might 
want to advocate for the use of microscopic explanations or explanations in terms of 
spatiotemporal or nonmental entities. But one shouldn’t confuse this with physicalism, a 
view that takes physics to have some privileged ontological or explanatory status among 
the sciences, since physics frequently violates such restrictions. 
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Moreover, such characterizations aren’t sufficient for a theory to be a physical theory. A 
theory that the world was fundamentally built out of tiny nonsentient amoebae, a theory 
derived from a drug-induced hallucination, would satisfy all three criteria for what it is to 
be a physical theory, yet this seems obviously not to be what the physicalist is after. 
Again, we shouldn’t take any of this to lead us to reject physicalism, because to 
be physicalists we don’t need a robust characterization of what it is to be physical or to be 
a physical theory. We just need a sense of what the physical theories we have look like, 
and which are empirically well-supported. 
 
5. No Positive Argument for a Future, Completed Physics 
We have just considered the first concern with completeness physicalism: the lack of an 
adequate conception of “physics” with which to evaluate what is meant by a future, 
completed physics. However, even if the concerns of the previous section could be 
addressed, there is still a question of why one should grant the assumption that there ever 
will be a completed physics one day in the future, or that such a theory is in principle 
possible. This section will consider different arguments that might be used to support the 
completeness physicalist’s assumption that there will be, or in principle could be, such a 
thing as a completed physics. 
First, logic or meaning alone doesn’t compel us to believe that physics will one 
day be complete. As Chomsky once noted, simply defining the fundamental physics as 
completed, true science makes physicalism trivial, “the material world is whatever we 
discover it to be, with whatever properties it must be assumed to have for the purposes of 
explanatory theory” (1998, p. 144). But it is not trivial that we are able to give an account 
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of phenomena as diverse as galactic expansion, the origin of life, and consciousness in 
terms of a few fundamental features and principles. 
A better strategy for supporting the claim that there will one day be a complete 
physical theory is to look for an inductive argument. But note: the way inductive 
arguments work is by seeing that there were some cases we observed in the past that all 
had something in common, and they all or generally turned out to be a certain way, and 
from there we infer that unobserved things that have that feature in common will also 
turn out to be that way. So, for example, we note that every raven we have observed up to 
now has been black and so we infer that the next one will be black too, or that they will 
all be black, or that ravens are generally black. In the present case, to give an inductive 
argument for the future completeness of physics, we would have to say something like, 
every time we have observed something needing an explanation, it has been given a 
physical explanation, therefore, eventually everything will have a physical explanation. 
The trouble though (setting aside the fact that the premise is false) is that we don’t have a 
similarity class to support the induction. When we are talking about absolutely everything 
and anything, there is no similarity that ties together the group of observed instances.16 So 
one can’t argue inductively to the conclusion that there will be a physical explanation for 
all facts. So one can’t argue inductively to the eventual existence of a complete physical 
theory. 
 To exhaust all of the options, we should also consider what may be said for an 
abductive argument for the claim that there will one day be a completed physics. This 
 
16 It has been suggested we restrict the induction to the contingently existing things. But 
one may dispute whether this makes for a similarity class. Are all contingently existing 
things intrinsically similar in virtue of their contingency? 
 20 
would require showing that the assumption of a future completed physics provides the 
best explanation of some fact. But what fact? One might say it provides the best 
explanation of the fact that we have been able to give physical explanations for a diverse 
class of phenomena in living and nonliving systems, on Earth and elsewhere in the 
cosmos. But does the hypothesis that there will be a complete physics provide the best 
explanation of the breadth of successful physical explanations? Isn’t rather the 
approximate truth of our current incomplete physical science a better, safer explanation of 
this success? I submit that it is. The hypothesis of a complete theory is much more than is 
needed to explain the history of successful physical explanations. 
We have now seen that there is no good argument for the claim that there will one 
day be a completed physics. We have no positive reason to believe in a future, true and 
completed physical theory. One might respond that we don’t need an argument that there 
will actually be in the future a complete physics, but only that there could be such a 
physics in principle (in a world like ours in certain relevant respects). But similar points 
apply. This isn’t something that is true by definition. A modified inductive argument of 
the form “All observed phenomena have been given physical explanations, therefore, all 
phenomena could in principle receive a physical explanation” is blocked again by there 
being no similarity class on which to base the induction. And the assumption of a 
possible complete physics is no better at explaining data than the assumption of an actual 
complete physics. It would thus be better to interpret physicalism in such a way that it is 
independent of such a completeness assumption. I stress my claim here is not that we 
know now there won’t be a completed physics. I do think there are reasons to be skeptical 
of this claim. But I am only saying we don’t have any positive justification for thinking 
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there will be or in principle could be a completed physics. And so the assumption 
shouldn’t be built into the very meaning of physicalism. Physicalism is better supported 
and more reasonable without it. 
 
6. Tensions with Philosophy of Science 
We may now turn to the third and final argument against completeness physicalism. 
There are several reasonable claims that mark important milestones of late twentieth 
century philosophy of science. When physicalism is viewed as a kind of completeness 
claim, these can prove disastrous for physicalism. A physicalist ought to provide an 
interpretation of her position and of the fundamentality of physics that is reasonable in 
light of these lessons. I will argue this is another reason to prefer maximality physicalism 
in the sense I have proposed. 
The first lesson of late twentieth century philosophy of science is that often the 
best explanation of a phenomenon is not the microphysical explanation, but rather some 
“higher level” or “special science” explanation. A classic illustration of this point comes 
from Putnam (1975) who asked us to consider the best explanation for why a certain peg 
is incapable of entering a hole: 
Very often we are told that if something is made of matter, its behavior must have 
a physical explanation. And the argument is that if it is made of matter (and we 
make a lot of assumptions), then there should be a deduction of its behavior from 
its material structure… On the other hand, if you are not ‘hipped’ on the idea that 
the explanation must be at the level of the ultimate constituents, and that in fact 
the explanation might have the property that the ultimate constituents don’t matter, 
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that only the higher level structure matters, then there is a very simple explanation 
here. The explanation is that the board is rigid, the peg is rigid, and as a matter of 
geometrical fact, the round hole is smaller than the peg, the square hole is bigger 
than the cross-section of the peg… That is a correct explanation whether the peg 
consists of molecules, or continuous rigid substance, or whatever. (1975, p. 296) 
Putnam actually takes a rather hard line here, insisting that the physical explanation is the 
wrong explanation, because it appeals to features that aren’t, in his words, relevant. This 
attitude has been agreed to by many philosophers of the special sciences. However, a 
more moderate position, one that is favored by other philosophers of science who have 
been influenced by Putnam’s example, is not that the physical explanation is the wrong 
explanation and the nonphysical explanation, appealing to higher level structural features, 
is the only explanation, but rather that the physical explanation provides a worse 
explanation and the nonphysical structural explanation provides the better explanation.  
Both the completeness and the maximality physicalist should agree that the 
physicalist claim that physics provides fundamental explanations doesn’t mean these 
explanations are better than any others in the senses one might care about for all purposes. 
That a higher level explanation is better in a given context does not by itself undermine 
the fundamentality of physics. A metaphysical claim to fundamentality should not be 
confused with a claim of superiority in all respects or importance. And so if the lesson 
one wishes to draw from Putnam’s example is that often the physical explanation is not 
the optimal one to use in a given context, then this is compatible with either form of 
physicalism.  
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On the other hand, if the lesson is supposed to be not that the nonphysical 
explanation is sometimes the better one, but instead that it is the correct one, then this 
does present a challenge. The difference between the higher level explanation being the 
right one vs. only the better one makes a difference to the viability of completeness 
physicalism. If the nonphysical explanation is the right explanation, then physics is not 
explanatorily complete.  
Note the maximality physicalist need not take a stand on this issue. She doesn’t 
need physics to be complete, only maximal. Her claim is only that physics provides 
precise and deep explanations of a wide range of phenomena. And so even if physics 
does not provide the right explanation of why a certain peg won’t go through a certain 
hole, there will be a host of related facts that the physical details do explain. That is what 
makes physics maximal. So this first milestone of late twentieth century philosophy of 
science supports maximality physicalism over completeness physicalism. 
Another lesson has to do with the form and intended scope of our scientific 
theories, including our best physical theories. Philosophers of science in practice note that 
scientists, physicists included, rarely try to formulate theories of everything from which 
we could derive all true facts of the universe. Rather their aims are generally to model 
some local phenomenon or other. This is true even of the most fundamental physical 
theories, quantum field theories or cosmological theories. 
This second point about most physical theories being local theories however 
provides a challenge to completeness physicalism. In the event that these many local 
theories (or models) cannot be patched together to form some one complete theory – and 
why think that they would? why would there not be gaps? – then this straightforwardly 
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undermines the claim that the world is the way some true completed physics says it is. 
Yet this does nothing to undermine maximality physicalism which relies only on the 
success, depth, breadth, and precision of physical explanations, not their completeness. I 
would take issue with the trope one finds in contemporary philosophy of science that 
physics is just one among many special sciences, that it does not have some special status 
among the sciences, of being fundamental. This is no doubt caused by the assumption 
that fundamentality must be cashed out in some notion of completeness. I of course am 
arguing here that there is a more realistic interpretation of the fundamentality of physics 
that does not require its completeness. And so the physicalist can uphold the “locavorism” 
defended by many philosophers of science (Ruetsche 2015), while maintaining the view 
that physics occupies a privileged status among the sciences, that it’s fundamental. 
A third milestone comes from feminist philosophy of science, which has 
questioned the reductionism implied in claims of the fundamentality of physics. To focus 
on one strand of argument, claims of the fundamentality of one science have been shown 
to lead to a potentially dangerous monopolization of resources that might be better used 
on projects that would have a more beneficial impact on our world. As Cartwright puts it: 
… theories that purport to be fundamental – to be able in principle to explain 
everything of a certain kind – often gain additional credibility just for that reason 
itself. They get an extra dollop of support beyond anything they have earned. 
(1999) 
Cartwright argues that we should move beyond viewing some theories or branches of 
science as fundamental and instead recognize that the reliability of any theory, including 
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those offered as “theories of everything,” have only limited applicability within a 
circumscribed domain.  
 The social consequences of claims of the fundamentality of physics are relevant to 
this issue of the best interpretation of physicalism and should not be ignored as they often 
are in metaphysical discussions. The physicalist should think through what a claim of the 
fundamentality of physics implies for the privileging of certain research projects over 
others. But it is possible to say a lot about the practical benefits that come with the 
funding of projects, even very expensive projects, in physics (Ney 2019). My point here, 
however, is that it is difficult to even begin to formulate these issues if we are taking the 
fundamentality of physics to imply the truth and completeness of some far distant 
perhaps unrealizable theory. And so if we are going to have a responsible defense of the 
claim of the fundamentality of a particular theory, then this ought to be a currently 
formulated theory we can evaluate for its practical consequences. 
 
7. The Inductive Arguments Again 
Taking stock, I have noted two ways in which the fundamentality of physics can be 
interpreted: as a claim about the completeness of some (at least in principle) future 
physical theory and as a claim about the maximality of current physical theory. I have 
defended the latter interpretation, arguing that physicalism is best interpreted as the claim 
that physics is fundamental in that sense, combined with the adoption of a set of attitudes. 
Physicalism should not be interpreted as the thesis that the world is exhaustively and 
completely the way some physical theory says it is. Part of my argument against the 
completeness approach was that there is no positive argument for there ever being a 
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completed physics (now or in the future). However, one might ask whether my points in 
that previous section undermine not just completeness physicalism, but any sort of 
physicalism, including the version I am advocating here. For the inductive argument I 
was criticizing looked like this: 
1. Many observed phenomena have received physical explanations. 
Therefore, 
2. All phenomena will receive physical explanations. (Completeness physicalism) 
My complaint was that since there is no unified class of phenomena that is the subject of 
the induction, any argument like this is bound to fail. So it seems the following argument 
with a substantially weakened conclusion would be equally bad: 
 1. Many observed phenomena have received physical explanations. 
 Therefore, 
 2. The next unexplained phenomenon will receive a physical explanation. 
The failure of this argument looks to be a problem even for the weaker maximality 
physicalism. A maximality physicalist will hold the view that physical explanations 
should be sought in general. And this is supposed to be an empirically based view, one 
that is reasonable in light of the past reductive successes of physical science. 
But there is no need to panic. Maximality physicalism is fine. To address this concern, 
we must distinguish between two types of phenomena the physicalist may encounter that 
do not yet have explanations in terms of physical science: those that are in a genuine 
sense like those that have already been explained, and those that are unlike those that 
have already been explained. For the phenomena that are genuinely like those that have 
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already been given physical explanations, there will be an inductive argument available. 
These arguments will have a narrower scope than those we considered above, e.g.: 
 1. Many observed macroscopic features of living things have received physical 
explanations. 
 Therefore, 
 2. All macroscopic features of living things will receive a physical explanation.17 
 This sort of inductive argument can be successful to the extent that the premise concerns 
a unified class of phenomena. I believe that it does. 
 As for phenomena that are unlike those that have already received physical 
explanations, here there won’t be an inductive argument we can use to underwrite the 
case for looking for a physics of those phenomena. But that is ok. After all, there isn’t an 
inductive case for looking for an alternative theory of phenomena like those either. 
Instead, what we can say is that since physics is by assumption the only well-supported 
game in town for a science of the most general, it is a good starting point. It’s a practical 
point of the “only game in town” variety that supports the development of physical 
explanations of the unknown and radically unlike what has already been explained (cf. 
Dawid 2013). There is no need for the maximality physicalist to hold that physics will in 
the end explain everything. For reasons I’ve already mentioned, that claim is 
unreasonable. But at the same time, the physicalist should be optimistic about current 




17 Note this is very much like the inductive argument for physicalism Papineau (2001) 
considers. 
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Although the standard interpretation of physicalism is problematic in the many ways I’ve 
noted, this doesn’t mean we should discard physicalism, discard the view that physics has 
a special status among the sciences, that it is fundamental. This would be an overreaction. 
There is a way of capturing physicalism and underwriting reductive philosophical and 
scientific projects that doesn’t rely on unmotivated assumptions and an outdated 
philosophy of science. I’ve called this maximality physicalism.  
I’ve focused above on physicalism’s role as a framework guiding certain research 
projects, those seeking to explain a diverse and initially disunified class of phenomena in 
physical terms. I don't mean here to say definitively that there is no purpose for which the 
claim that there will be a completed physical theory may be useful. There is no harm in 
physics (in some branches) trying to achieve that goal. But this claim is both stronger and 
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